J.E.B. v. ALABAMA
114 S.Ct. 1419 (1994)
United States Supreme Court by unknown
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice
Volume 1 | Issue 1 Article 14
Spring 4-1-1995
J.E.B. v. ALABAMA 114 S.Ct. 1419 (1994) United
States Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice at Washington & Lee
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice by an
authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
J.E.B. v. ALABAMA 114 S.Ct. 1419 (1994) United States Supreme Court, 1 Race & Ethnic Anc. L. Dig. 57 (1995).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj/vol1/iss1/14
J.E.B. v. ALABAMA
114 S.Ct. 1419 (1994)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
The State of Alabama filed a complaint for pa-
ternity and child support against J.E.B. in the Dis-
trict Court of Jackson County, Alabama. Petitioner
appealed the district court's child support order,
requesting a jury trial in a circuit court, where dis-
trict court decisions are subject to de novo review.
Jury selection began on October 21, 1991, from
a panel of thirty-six potential jurors, twelve males
and twenty-four females. The court excused three
jurors for cause, leaving ten males remaining out of
thirty-three jurors. The State then used nine of its
ten peremptory strikes to remove male jurors, while
petitioner used all but one of his strikes to remove
female jurors, resulting in an all female jury. Peti-
tioner objected to the State's peremptory challenges
on the ground that they were exercised against male
jurors solely on the basis of gender, in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. He claimed that such actions were in
violation of his rights to equal protection and due
process. The court rejected petitioner's claim, and
empaneled the all-female jury, which found peti-
tioner to be the father of the child. The court en-
tered an order directing him to pay child support.
On post-judgment motion, the court reaffirmed its
ruling that Batson v. Kentucky' does not extend to
gender-based peremptory challenges. The Alabama
Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Supreme
Court of Alabama denied certiorari,3 and the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
HOLDING
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Alabama Court of Civil Appeals and remanded the
case to that court for further proceedings. In a six to
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
2 J.E.B. v. Alabama, 606 So. 2d 156 (Ala. Civ. App.
1992).
SJ.E.B. v.Alabama, No. 1911717 (Ala. 1992).
4 476 U.S. at 79.
1 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614
(1991).
6 Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S.Ct. 2348 (1992).
three opinion written by Justice Blackmun, the
Court extended the reach of the Equal Protection
Clause as enunciated in Batson v. Kentucky4 to gen-
der-based peremptory challenges, holding that in-
tentional discrimination by state actors exercising
peremptory challenges on the basis of gender vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION
I. Heightened Scrutiny, Peremptory
Challenges, and a Fair and Impartial Jury
Prior to J.E.B., Batson's holding, forbidding pros-
ecutors to use peremptory challenges against poten-
tial jurors solely on account of their race, had al-
ready been extended by subsequent cases to apply
to civil litigants' and criminal defendants.6 In addi-
tion, in Powers v. Ohio,7 the Court found that crimi-
nal defendants suffer real injury, and thus have stand-
ing to raise their interests, when prosecutors exclude
jurors at their trials on account of race, even if the
defendants are not members of the excluded group.
8
Against this background, the Court granted certio-
rari to J.E.B. 9 in order to resolve a question that had
created a conflict of authority - whether the Equal
Protection Clause forbids peremptory challenges on
the basis of gender as well as on the basis of race.'0
Unlike classifications based on race, which are
inherently suspect, gender-based classifications are
subject to the less exacting standard of heightened
equal protection scrutiny." The J.E.B. Court did not
consider whether classifications based on gender are
inherently suspect. The Court, however, noted that
under equal protection jurisprudence, gender-based
classifications require an "exceedingly persuasive
justification" in order to survive.'2
The State claimed that "an exceedingly persua-
sive justification" for respondent's gender-based pe-
7 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
8 Id. at 400.
9 JE.B. v. TB., 113 S. Ct. 2330 (1993).
10 J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1422 (1994).
" Id. at 1424.
,2 Id. at 1425 (citing FersonnelAdminirtrator of Mass.
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)).
remptory challenges was shown by the state's asser-
tion of a historically justified perception that in a
paternity action, men would be more sympathetic
to the arguments of a man while women would be
more receptive to the arguments of the mother. 3
The Court held that the State's rationale was "remi-
niscent of the arguments advanced to justify the to-
tal exclusion of women from juries." 4 The State re-
peated "the very stereotypes the law condemns," s
and were unacceptable even if some statistical sup-
port could be provided for such generalizations.'
In addition, the Court pointed out that both Afri-
can-Americans and women have shared a history of
total exclusion from jury service.' 7 Far from being
distinct, as the State claimed, victims of racial dis-
crimination and sex discrimination have had pro-
foundly similar negative experiences in voting and
jury service.'
8
Discrimination in jury selection, whether based
on race or on gender, causes harm to the litigants,
the community, and the individual jurors who are
wrongfully excluded from participation in the judi-
cial process.'" Furthermore, discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges may create the impression
that the judicial system has acquiesced in suppress-
ing full participation by one gender.2" Individual ju-
rors, when granted the opportunity to serve on a
jury, have the right not to be excluded summarily
because of discriminatory and stereotypical pre-
sumptions that reflect and reinforce patterns of his-
torical discrimination.2'
The matter in dispute, the Court asserted, is not
the balancing of the value of peremptory challenges
with the commitment to eradicate invidious dis-
crimination from the courtroom.-- Rather, the issue
is whether, given the heightened equal protection
scrutiny afforded gender-based classifications, the
State's legitimate interest in achieving a fair and
impartial jury can survive.2-
Although Justice Blackmun stated that peremp-
tory challenges are not constitutionally protected
" Id. at 1426 (quoting Brief for Respondent, at 10).
'I Id.
Is d. (citing Powers, 499 U.S. at 410).
Id. at 1427.




21 Id. at 1428.
22 Id. at 1425-1426.
2" Id. at 1425.
rights,24 and that the sole purpose of peremptory
challenges is to assist the government in the selec-
tion of an impartial trier of fact,2 s he made it clear
that the demise of peremptory challenges was not a
necessary result of the Court's holding and that bar-
ring gender-based strikes does not conflict with the
State's legitimate interest in using peremptory chal-
lenges to secure a fair and impartial jury.21" Parties
may exercise their peremptory challenges to remove
from the venire any group or class of individuals
normally subject to rational basis review. 27 Further,
strikes based on characteristics that are dispropor-
tionately associated with one gender could even be
appropriate, absent a showing of pretext.
2 8
Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment,
noted that an individual denied jury service because
of a gender-based peremptory challenge is no less
injured than an individual denied jury service be-
cause of a law banning members of her sex from
serving as jurors. -1 Justice Kennedy claimed that the
neutrality of the Equal Protection Clause's guaran-
tee to "any person" is extended in the instant case to
the finding of a constitutional wrong where men are
excluded from jury service because of their gender;
the Equal Protection Clause is based on the theory
that the individual possesses rights which are pro-
tected against lawless action by the government.-"'
Justice O'Connor, also writing concurrently,
urged the view that the limitations to
peremptories should apply only to state actors."'
Justice O'Connor noted that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause prohibits discrimination by state ac-
tors; she maintained that neither private litigants
nor criminal defendants are state actors.-2 Recog-
nizing the peremptory challenge as one of the
most important rights secured by the accused,3"
and claiming that gender can make a difference
as a matter of fact, Justice O'Connor argued
against limiting the criminal defendant's or the
civil litigant's use of the peremptory. She asserted
that extending Batson to gender diminishes the
24 Id. at 1426, n.7 (citing Georgia v. McCollumn, 12
S.Ct. 2348, 2358 (1992)).
2Id. at 1426, n. 8 (citing Edmonson ,. Leesville Con-
crete Co., I 11 S.Ct. 2077 (1991)).
2,, Id. at 1428.
- Id. at 1429.
_, Id. at 1429, n 16.
2" Id. at 1434.
' Id. at 1433-1434.
11 Id. at 1432.
'12 Id.
%3 Id.
ability of litigants to act on sometimes accurate
gender-based assumptions about juror attitudes.
34
In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued
that the primary issue at stake, contrary to Justice
Blackmun's characterization, was a balancing of the
dictates of equal protection and the historical prac-
tice of peremptory challenges. In this balancing, the
significant differences between racial and sex dis-
crimination justify a ruling favoring peremptory
challenges over equal protection when gender-based
challenges are at issue.35 Chief Justice Rehnquist
asserted that the less searching standard of height-
ened scrutiny for gender-based classifications, as
compared to that of strict scrutiny for classifications
based on race, does not justify tilting the balance in
favor of equal protection when sex, not race, is the
issue
36
Justice Scalia, also dissenting, distinguished be-
tween past objectionable exclusion of women from
juries because of doubt that they were competent,
and situations in which women, like any other group,
are subject to be stricken from juries by peremp-
tory challenges because of doubt that they are well
disposed to the striking party's case.37 He claimed
that in the totality of the practice of the peremp-
tory challenge, no group is denied equal protection
where each side's desire to get a jury favorably dis-
posed to its case is given full play, so long as both
sides do not systematically strike individuals of one
group.38 He opined that it is unrealistic to focus on
individual exercises of the challenge and ignore the
totality of the practice.39 Justice Scalia saw the
Court's decision as placing all peremptory strikes
based on any group characteristic at risk, since they
can all be denominated "stereotypes."40 Even if Batson
is limited to race, sex, and perhaps other classifica-
tions subject to heightened scrutiny, Justice Scalia
argued that the peremptory challenge system has
been damaged when reasons for strikes must be
given, and that the loss of true peremptories will be
felt most keenly by criminal defendants.4' He noted
also that while demographic reality places limit on
cases in which race-based challenges will be an is-
sue, every case contains a potential sex-based claim.42
3 Id. at 1432-1433.
35 Id. at 1435.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 1436-1437 (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
at 424).
38 Id. at 1437.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 1438.
11. The Likelihood of Further Limitations on
Peremptory Challenges
Justice Blackmun pointed out that where pe-
remptory challenges are made on the basis of group
characteristics other than race or gender, they do
not reinforce the same stereotypes about the group's
competence or predisposition that have been used
to prevent them from voting, participating on ju-
ries, pursuing their chosen professions, or otherwise
contributing to civic life.43 A weak case could be
made on the basis of this dicta that no further ex-
pansion of Batson is necessary to protect groups who
have been discriminated against in exercising their
rights to vote and to serve as jurors. If this line of
reasoning is taken, it seems unlikely that Batson
would be extended to reach any other group, and
the alleged erosion of the peremptory challenge
would be halted.
However, in line with the heightened scrutiny
portion of the Court's argument, it would seem logi-
cal to continue extending Batson to other group clas-
sifications afforded heightened scrutiny, such as age
Multiple "modified peremptories" as Barbara Allen
Babcock terms them in A Place in the Palladium:
Women's Rights And Jury Service,44 would limit the
scope of the pure peremptory more and more as
the number of Batson-type groups increased.
III. The Process of Responding to
Batson-type Claims
Justices O'Connor and Scalia alluded to pos-
sible problems in putting this particular extension
of Batson into practice. Justice Blackmun, however, -
claimed that jurisdictions which already disallow
gender-based discrimination show that they are ca-
pable of complying with a rule barring strikes based
on gender.4 Just as in a Batson claim, the alleging
party must make a prima fade showing of inten-
tional discrimination. Only after a prima facie show-
ing has been made does the burden shift to the other
party to come forward with a neutral explanation
for challenging female jurors. When an explanation
is required, it need not rise to the level of a "for
cause" challenge; rather, it merely must be based on
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1439; See also, Raphael and Unguarsky, Ex-
cuses, Excuses: Neutral Explanations Under Batson v, Ken-
tucky, 27 U. Mich. J.L. Ref 229 (1993).
43 J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1428, n. 14.
44 Babcock, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1139, 1179 (1993).
41 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429.
a juror characteristic other than gender or race, and
the explanation may not be pretextual.46 Thus, the
process is manageable, just as it has been manage-
able under Batson.
In practice, the process seems to stray from what
the Batson court intended and foreshadows what
practical effect J.E.B. will have. Although the pro-
cess appears to present no particular difficulty for
most counsel to handle, it is debatable whether the
availability of the Batson claim is making jury selec-
tion less discriminatory.
In their article Excuses, Excuses: Neutral Expla-
nations Under Batson v. Kentucky,4 7 Michael J.
Raphael and Edward J. Ungvarsky report research
in criminal cases in which an African-American de-
fendant challenges a prosecutor's strikes of African-
American jurors; the research has shown that pros-
ecutors wishing to rebut the prima facie case do not
face a significant challenge.48 Only small percent-
ages of the neutral explanations for peremptory
strikes were rejected.4:' Furthermore, in almost any
situation, a prosecutor can craft an acceptable neu-
tral explanation to justify striking African-Ameri-
can jurors who were stricken because of their race.5"
There is no reason to suppose that producing a
neutral explanation in the face of a prima facie show-
ing of gender-based discrimination will be any more
difficult, unless the striking party finds an insur-
mountable hurdle in producing an explanation
which is both race-neutral and gender-neutral. -'
Even under these circumstances, the education of
46 Id. at 1430.
47 Raphael, 27 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 229 (Fall 1993).
48 Id. at 235.
411 Id. at 235.
5( Id.
s' J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1430. As Justice Blackmun
notes, because they are overlapping, gender could have
been used as a pretext for racial discrimination before J.E.B.
those faced with the challenge of offering an expla-
nation which is both race-neutral and gender-neu-
tral can be expected to reach the same heights (or
depths) as that of those offering race-neutral expla-
nations. Despite the greater potential number of
gender-based claims, if they are quickly dispatched,
no greater burden is placed on the system than now
exists. Although manageable, little good is done in
the way of actually ensuring equal protection if dis-
criminatory strikes are simply phrased in neutral lan-
guage, and thus allowed.
CONCLUSION
After J.E.B., if a prima facie case is made for
gender-based discrimination in the state's exercise
of a peremptory strike, a gender-neutral explana-
tion must be offered. Without a gender-neutral ex-
planation, the strike will not stand up to scrutiny
unless an exceedingly persuasive justification can be
shown for the gender-based challenge, a task with
little chance of success given the requirement that
"stereotypes the law condemns" may not be used.
Following Batson's lead, J.E.B. will likely be extended
to private civil litigants and criminal defendants.
Possible future extension of Batson to other group
classifications subject to heightened scrutiny will
depend on additional case law. Arguments can be
made on the basis of J.E.B. both for and against fur-
ther expansion of Batson beyond race and gender.
The Court has taken a firm stand against racial
and gender-based discrimination toward individuals
in any aspect of the jury selection process; counsel
must modify practices to conform with racial and
gender-blind policies in exercising peremptory
strikes, and be prepared for more Batson-type claims
in the wake of J.E.B.
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